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ABSTRACT:    
Models of household economics require an understanding of economic 
interactions in families. Social ties, repetition and reduced strategic uncertainty 
make social dilemmas in couples a very special case that needs to be empirically 
studied.   
In this paper we present results from a large economic experiment with 100 
maritally living couples. Participants made decisions in a social dilemma with 
their partner and with a stranger. We predict behavior in this task with individual 
and couples' socio-demographic variables, efficiency preferences and couples' 
marital satisfaction. As opposed to models explaining behavior amongst strangers, 
the regressions on couples’ decisions highlight clear patterns concerning 
cooperation behavior which could inspire future household decision-making 
models.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Behavior in social dilemmas has received much attention since the first discussion of the 
prisoners' dilemma by Flood and Dresher in 1950 (Poundstone, 1992). The focus has been 
mostly on explaining why cooperation does exist and persist in anonymous, non-repeated 
interactions for which opportunism is predicted. However, the other extreme, namely non-
anonymous and repeated dilemmas played by friends and families, has so far received little 
attention. Given that households form a large and important part of the economy, intra-family 
behaviors need to be incorporated into economic models. Models of family economics have 
received an increased interest since Becker (1981); however the theory of household decision-
making is still far from an accurate representation of reality. This is mainly due to a lack of 
evidence concerning the validity of the underlying assumptions of the models, especially 
those concerning individual egoism and efficiency. Experimental economics has helped 
uncover many of the principles concerning strategic interactions between individuals. Since 
experiments are usually done with participants anonymous to each other, results from such 
studies can only be partially applied to households. Family ties will most likely lead to 
strategies distinct from those applied to strangers. This paper experimentally studies the effect 
of such ties on economic behavior in couples. We thus combine two important contributions 
to the literature: we investigate the underlying assumptions of household models and extend 
results from experimental economics to the very special subject pool of couples. 
Strategic interactions in pair wise social dilemmas have been extensively studied in 
experimental economics and psychology (Suleiman et al., 2004). Partners in such experiments 
are usually participants that meet for the first time in the experimental environment. 
Nevertheless cooperation is observed even among unknown strangers. However it is most 
likely that interacting with a partner that is personally known and to which exists a strong 
social tie (van Winden et al., 2008) will induce a variety of additional effects. Naturally 
interactions with friends and family are always repeated, thus concerns for reputation and 
reciprocity might increase cooperation levels. From the Folk Theorem we know that 
cooperation can be sustained in repeated games. In families and with friends, cooperation 
might be also enhanced by other factors. Friends might be able to predict their behaviors, 
therefore reducing the strategic uncertainty of a game. Further, friends and family are most 
  
   
  3 
 
likely weighted more strongly than strangers in a utility function including other regarding 
preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). Taken together we would 
expect strong cooperation and coordination between players that know each other.  
In couples’ real decision-making process, a variety of games exists where behavior cannot be 
observed by the partner. Examples include situations where earnings or effort can be hidden 
from the partner. Incomplete information concerning salary primes, monetary presents or pay 
raises can lead to dilemma situations in the couple. Revealing the increase and investing in the 
couples common good can lead to efficiency increases whereas an individual incentive exists 
to use the extra money for private consumption. Similarly investment in the family (job 
change, moving and the decision to have children) depends on the trust that the partner will be 
cooperative in the future. This cooperation cannot be enforced by a contract and thus 
represents a situation of limited commitment. The question is thus whether strategies 
employed in repeated, public interactions will necessarily spill over to one-shot interactions 
for couples where actions are not observed. Our aim is to investigate the question whether 
couples do cooperate in an anonymous one-shot setting and to identify which variables can 
predict whether couples will cooperate or not. This will enhance our understanding of 
behavior of couples in anonymous social dilemmas played in the family. 
Some of the aspects characterizing couples have already been experimentally studied. To test 
effects of joint group membership, participants are sometimes given more or less time to get 
to know each other and to familiarize. In psychology the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel et 
al., 1971) has been used to show that randomly grouped participants favor members of their 
own group over member of other groups, even if groups had been randomly created in the 
laboratory. More recent experiments on in-group versus out-group favoritism have 
investigated this paradigm with natural groups, e.g. officers from different platoons in the 
Swiss army (Goette et al., 2006) or from small indigenous groups in Papua New Guinea 
(Bernhard et al., 2006). However even though in these experiments group membership was 
known, the concrete identity of the partner was still unknown to players. Some experiments 
further allowed face-to-face contact and communication before the experiment (Bochet et al., 
2006; Bohnet and Frey, 1999). These studies show that identifiability of the partner increases 
cooperation. Only a few studies explicitly investigated the social ties that participants had 
formed outside the laboratory (Reuben and van Winden, 2008). We will go even one step 
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further. Not only do the partners known with whom they are playing and know this person 
from outside the laboratory, but this person is also the partner with whom they share bed and 
board.  
Only few studies have previously used couples to study behavior in economically relevant 
tasks. De Palma et al. (forthcoming) investigate the link between the individuals' and the 
couple’s attitude toward risk. Bateman and Munro (2005) test various features of household 
decision making, including Pareto-optimality and income pooling. However their focus is on 
decisions in a risky environment, using an experiment involving choices between lotteries. 
Ashraf (2009) investigates spouses’ saving decisions under various conditions. We are only 
aware of two studies dealing with family behaviour in social dilemma games. Peters et al. 
(2004) study the behaviour of family members in a public good game. Contributions within 
the family are higher than with strangers, however still below full cooperation, at 
approximately 84%. Iversen et al. (2006) find that couples in rural Uganda, fail to achieve the 
efficient outcome in a variant of a public good game. Altruism is not rejected, but there is 
evidence for opportunism, i.e. the tendency to hide one's initial endowment from the partner.  
Many economic studies have already investigated which factors can predict behavior in 
anonymous non-repeated interactions (Roth, 1995). Even though the precise mechanisms are 
still not fully understood, a number of potentially important demographic and psychological 
variables have been discussed. Many studies have concentrated on gender differences in 
cooperation (e.g. Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001). However the evidence from existing 
studies is mixed. Indeed it seems that men and women react differently to the context and 
framing of a situation and that therefore dependent on studies different results have been 
observed (Croson and Gneezy, 2008). Psychologists and economists have further worked on 
identifying a personality profile predictive of cooperation in social dilemmas (e.g. van Lange 
et al., 1997). The classification instrument proposed by van Lange et al. (1997) includes the 
category of 'prosocial' which seems predictive of cooperation. It is worth noting that this 
classification is based on a preference of choices that are joint income maximizing (i.e. 
'efficient'). Thus a concern for efficiency will most likely increase the tendency to cooperate 
in a social dilemma. Also explicit empathy for the partner leads to higher cooperation rates 
(Batson and Moran, 1999). Further there have been a number of studies on the impact of 
education and intelligence on cooperation. It seems that intelligence has a positive impact on 
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cooperation (Jones, 2008) however that training in economics has a negative impact (Frank et 
al., 1993). Finally there have been a number of attempts to relate risk aversion to decisions 
involving strategic uncertainty (Eckel and Wilson, 2004), but evidence is mixed and gives to 
date no clear results. 
The aim of this paper is to study behavior in a social dilemma game played by spouses. We 
report results from a large economic experiment on 100 couples that participated in three one-
shot prisoner’s dilemma games. To observe cooperation levels in repeated interactions in 
couples we also study a bargaining task within the couple. Outcomes enable us to observe the 
increase in opportunism when spouses are sure that their decisions are unobserved. We will 
then explain this opportunism by taking into account individual and couple characteristics. 
Specifically we regress behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma on a number of individual 
characteristics (gender, age, education, income), characteristics of the couple (marriage, 
children, differences in education level) and attitudes towards the couple (concern for 
efficiency in the couple, psychological harmony). As opposed to models explaining behavior 
amongst strangers, the regressions on couples’ decisions highlight clear patterns concerning 
cooperation behavior which could inspire future household decision-making models. 
The rest of the paper will be structured as follows. Section 2 will introduce the specific 
experimental tasks and present hypothesis concerning behavior of couples. Section 3 will 
specify the methods used for the experiment. Section 4 will present results and section 5 will 
conclude. 
2. TASKS AND HYPOTHESES 
Our study presented couples with three variants of a prisoner’s dilemma and a bargaining 
task. In this section we will briefly present these tasks and present our hypotheses concerning 
behavioral differences of couples compared to partners not knowing each others. Spouses 
(a)  D C  (b) D C 
D 200, 200 310, 135 
 
D 200, 200 310, 160 
C 135, 310 245, 245 
 
C 110, 310 220, 270 
FIGURE 1: (A) SYMMETRIC PRISONERS' DILEMMA; (B) ASYMMETRIC PRISONERS' DILEMMA WITH ROW PLAYER FACING 
HIGHER EFFORT COST 
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further participated in a number of other tasks and answered a series of questionnaires that 
will be later used as explanatory variables of couples cooperation. We will present the 
included tasks in section 2.2. 
2.1. PRISONER’S DILEMMA AND BARGAINING 
Many decisions in households are taken simultaneously, independently and provide strong 
incentives to free-ride on the other. Examples include the possibility to hide unexpected 
income like salary primes or presents. Naturally most other interactions in the couple are 
repeated and communication is possible. We therefore presented participants with a number 
of prisoner dilemma games to investigate dilemmas where actions are unobservable and a 
bargaining task to provide a baseline of cooperation when communication is allowed. 
Couples participated in a total of three prisoner dilemma games. Two of these games were 
symmetric and one was asymmetric (see Figure 1). In the first symmetric game spouses 
played with their partner, while in the second symmetric game they played with another 
participant of the same sex as their partner. Our predictions are that participants are more 
likely to cooperate when interacting with their own partner, than with a stranger.  
The third game was designed to stress-test the couple's propensity to cooperate. Again 
participants interacted with their partner, however faced an asymmetric game (see Figure 
1:B), where one of the spouses experienced a higher effort cost. By introducing inequality in 
the pay-off functions and changing the individual incentives to deviate from the cooperative 
outcome, this game introduces a tradeoff between efficiency and equity. The question is 
whether inequality in the pay-off functions will reduce spouses’ propensity to reach the 
Pareto-efficient outcome. Both directions concerning intra-household inequality are explored: 
male disfavored and female disfavored. The symmetry of the results can reveal whether there 
exists a gender difference in the taste for inequality and whether or not either case is less 
costly at the collective level.  
It should be noted that participants were guaranteed that their behavior in each of the three 
prisoner’s dilemma would stay completely unobservable. Even though they knew with whom 
they were playing we stressed that participants could not deduce from their earnings the move 
of their partner. This was done by selecting randomly only one decision out of many for each 
task and giving only total earnings over a variety of tasks to participants. Thus we could 
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guarantee to participants that their partner would never be able to find out about their 
behavior. 
While observations from the prisoner’s dilemma give us information about cooperation in 
anonymous interactions in couples we still have to control for the hypothesis that couples will 
strongly cooperate when interactions are repeated and choices are common knowledge. We 
therefore presented spouses with a bargaining task for which we can observe to which degree 
couples arrive at the efficient or egalitarian bargaining outcome. The task was a free-form 
unstructured bargaining game, allowing for any kind of bargaining structure and free transfer 
of tokens between partners. 
The game we employed is similar to other free form bargaining games (e.g. Nydegger and 
Owen, 1975; Gaechter and Riedel, 2005). Participants were each endowed with 10 tokens and 
received independently an exchange rate concerning their token to money. Two exchange 
rates were possible, a high rate of 0.40 euro for one token and a low rate of 0.20 euro for one 
token. The probability to receive either exchange rate was equal to 1/2.
1
 Each participant 
received his exchange rate in private. Bargaining concerned the distribution of the total of 20 
tokens between the two partners. 
Participants were free to send any kind of written messages to their partner and had to reach 
an agreement in a limited time span. Particularly they could also reveal their exchange rate if 
they wished, however partners were unable to verify such information. Contrary to other 
bargaining games, the identity of the bargaining partner was known to participants, i.e. they 
were informed that they were playing with their spouse.  
Earlier studies have investigated the complete as well as the incomplete information case of 
this game. Outcomes can be classified in three categories: aiming for equality; own payoff 
maximization; or efficiency. However efficient outcomes are usually not reached when 
strangers interact. Under complete information about the other partners exchange rate high 
levels of final payout equality are observed (Roth et al., 1981), whereas under incomplete 
information a stronger incentive for free riding exists. Due to the strong effects in the 
complete information case, we will only study the case of incomplete information for couples. 
                                                             
1
 Note that because of this random draw only about half or our couples will be endowed with different exchange 
rates.  Due to this design feature we can draw from this game only conclusions concerning overall efficiency in 
couples and not deduce a measure of efficiency for each couple.  
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Our interest concerns whether couples will focus on equal distribution in final payoffs or on 
an efficient outcome that might be unequal across spouses. 
2.3. INDIVIDUAL AND COUPLES CHARACTERISTICS 
To explain behavior in the social dilemma a number of characteristics of the individual and 
the couple were collected. Specifically we measured the socio-demographic characteristics of 
the couple and the individual, the individual concern for efficiency and the psychological 
harmony in the couple.
2
 We will discuss these factors in the following. 
a. Efficiency  
Cooperative behavior in a prisoners' dilemma might be influenced by the specific weight that 
is given to efficiency gains. Van Lange et al. (1999) showed that prosocial individuals are 
more likely to cooperate in a prisoner's dilemma. Even though this classification is correlated 
with efficiency it does not provide a measure of the strength of the individuals concern for 
efficiency. Indeed it seems likely that there is a trade-off between efficiency and equity. To 
control for this we presented couples an individual dictator-like distribution task. Results from 
this task will be used as an explanatory variable concerning cooperation in the social dilemma 
games. 
In the efficiency task participants had to decide between two allocations of points between 
themselves and their partner. Each decision gave the choice between an option A which 
consisted of an equal split of an amount X, and an option B which consisted of the distribution 
of an amount α X (with α >1). The distribution for option B got varied across decisions (see 
Table 1). Participants were presented with two tasks of this type. The first with α = 1.125, the 
second with α = 1.5. Naturally option B is always efficient. However there might be a tradeoff 
between equity and efficiency, leading participants to prefer the equal but inefficient option.  
                                                             
2
 Further also individual risk aversion was elicited (Holt and Laury, 2002) and participants faced a joint risk 
taking task. Results will not be discussed in this paper.  
  
   
  9 
 
For strangers we would expect a choice of option B for decisions where their own share is 
larger than their partners (i.e. 4 to 6). Option A will be chosen when inequality very much 
disfavors the decision maker. At which percentage efficiency is regarded as more important 
than inequality will depend on the individuals' preferences (decisions 1, 2 and 3). Further, 
dictator games have shown that equality might be favored over complete egoism (decision 7) 
even in an anonymous setting. Behavior in couples might deviate in two directions from this. 
Due to the non-anonymity of couples' interactions, fairness and equality might have a stronger 
weight. However the assumption of income pooling after the experiment, could lead to a 
stronger preferences for efficient outcomes. Our interest is to evaluate the strength of couples' 
preferences for efficiency, even if this decision is not communicated to their partner.  
b. Sociodemographic questionnaire 
We collected individual and household data that might help explain cooperative as well as 
income pooling tendencies. These include information on: age, education, employment, 
leisure time, domestic work and variables concerning the individuals' financial situation. On 
the couples' level we have information on the number of year of joint life, number of children, 
household income and joint assets. We further asked spouses to indicate their partners' 
income; a measure that can be used to evaluate to which degree they are informed about the 
wealth of their spouse. To control for the possibility of income pooling we asked couples 
TABLE I: DISTRIBUTION TASK 
 low option (A) high option (B) 
 share for self share for other share for self share for other 
1. X/2 X/2 0 α X 
2. X/2 X/2 1/6 α X 5/6 α X 
3. X/2 X/2 1/3 α X 2/3 α X 
4. X/2 X/2 1/2 α X 1/2 α X 
5. X/2 X/2 2/3 α X 1/3 α X 
6. X/2 X/2 5/6 α X 1/6 α X 
7. X/2 X/2 α X 0 
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whether they owned an individual and/or joint bank account.
3
  
c. Psychological questionnaire  
Due to the obvious importance of trust and other regarding preferences on cooperation, we 
also have to consider the relationship between partners. Even though social ties are expected 
to be strong among spouses, across couples we are likely to observe a large heterogeneity. To 
control for this, we asked participants to fill out a strictly anonymous personality 
questionnaire to measure adjustment in the couple (dyadic adjustment scale; Spanier, 1976)
4
. 
This 32 item questionnaire is a widely used and validated instrument to investigate happiness, 
harmony and trust in a couple. It has been shown to be a very good predictor of success in 
couple counseling and has been used in studies of unusual stress (unemployment, illness, etc) 
in couples (Baxter, 1988; Kinnunen and Feldt, 2004; Prouty et al., 2000). We expect that this 
measure will also be predictive of cooperative and trusting behavior in our economic games.
5
  
3. METHODS 
The experiment was conducted in June 2008 at the Toulouse School of Economics, France. 
Participants were recruited by newspaper reports about the ongoing study, flyers and 
information provided on a website. The recruitment information specified that heterosexual 
couples, between 25 and 65 years old were invited to participate in a study of economic 
decisions in couples. Couples were required to live together
6
 and invited to sign up jointly for 
one two hour session. The announcements further specified that each participant would earn, 
dependent on his decisions and on chance, an amount between 20 and 60 Euros for 
participation. 
In total 101 couples participated in the study. Mean age was for men: 35.3 years and for 
women: 33.5 years and couples had been living together for an average of 7.9 years. We 
                                                             
3
 Owning a joint or individual bank account is likely to be information about couples’ income pooling behavior 
than the actual sharing of earnings from the experiment. Actual income pooling of experimental earnings is not 
observable and statements might be biased by norms, guilt feelings or by the fact that income pooling is done 
unconsciously (McCabe and Smith, 2001).  
4
 We will use the validated French translation of the dyadic adjustment scale according to Baillargeon et al. 
(1986).  
5
 Of the four subscales the "affective expression" subscale was suppressed for this study due to its possibly too 
offensive nature. The three remaining subscales are: Consensus, Satisfaction and Cohesion (see Appendix B). 
6
 A number of control questions that were part of the demographic questionnaire were used to check whether 
participants were truly in a relationship. 
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conducted a total of 19 sessions, with at least 4 and at most 6 couples being present. The 
experiment was conducted by paper and pencil in a class room at the Toulouse School of 
Economics. Great care was taken to explain each part of the instructions as simple as possible 
and decision sheets were presented in a graphically intuitive way (see Appendix C). 
Computers were avoided due to the large variance in age and educational backgrounds of our 
participants. 
Upon arrival participants were invited to a reception room that provided some refreshments 
and journals. When all couples had arrived, we announced that the study was about to begin 
and that participants should not communicate in the lab. Couples were seated couple by 
couple in six rows of tables in the laboratory. Men respectively women, were all seated on the 
same side of the room. Partitions divided the tables of a couple. The layout of the room was 
such that participants were well aware that their partner was seated on the other side of the 
partition, however they were unable to see them during the study. 
Couples participated in five experimental parts and a questionnaire part. The timeline of the 
different parts of the study is described in Table 2. Instructions to the different parts of the 
experiment were always read aloud and explained by help of video projection of the decision 
sheets. Participants were actively encouraged to ask questions if something was not clear to 
them. After instructions were read, a short summary of the instructions was distributed and 
participants had to answer a short control question to test their understanding. When 
participants had finished reading the summary they were invited to mark their decision on the 
decision sheets. 
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Initial instructions informed participants that they were about to participate in a study on 
decision making in which they have to take a number of decisions. It was explained that the 
study would consist of a number of separate parts, each part consisting of one or more 
decisions to be taken. Earnings from the experiment were calculated in an experimental 
currency (“Francs Toulousains”: FT), which were exchanged to euro at the end of the session. 
It was stressed that decisions were individual, private and anonymous and that especially their 
partner would have no opportunity to find out about their choices. To ensure anonymity and 
to incentivize all choices, one decision from each part was randomly selected at the end for 
payout. Participants were only informed about their aggregate earnings and thus could not 
deduce from their earnings the choices of their partner.  
Part one of the study consisted of a series of prisoner dilemma games. Participants first 
interacted with their partner, then with another participant of the same sex as their partner and 
were finally exposed to the asymmetric game in which they again interacted with their 
partner. One of the three situations was later selected for payout. In the second part of the 
study participants responded to the risk aversion task from Holt and Laury (2002). One of the 
choices was later selected for payout. In the next part couples were bargaining over the 
distribution of a number of tokens. The fourth part of the experiment consisted of a number of 
distribution choices, in which each partner had to choose between an equal and an unequal but 
more efficient distribution. One of the choices from either the man or the woman was later 
TABLE II: TIMELINE OF EXPERIMENTAL SESSION 
0) Welcome and general instructions 
1) Prisoners dilemma games  
a. own partner - symmetric 
b. stranger - symmetric 
c. own partner - asymmetric  
2) Risk aversion task  
3) Free form bargaining with written exchange of messages  
4) Distribution choices  
5) Sociodemographic questionnaire 
6) Psychological questionnaire (Marital adjustment scale) 
7) Individual private payout and good bye 
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selected for payout.  
When all couples had finished, a volunteer among participants was chosen to supervise the 
randomization procedure to decide which decisions would be paid out for real. For this the 
participant had to roll dice under supervision or pick a random number out of a box with 
numbered tickets. We then proceeded to the calculation of gains and earnings. Participants 
were asked to regain their original seats in the laboratory and respond to a final questionnaire. 
Again it was stressed that answers to the questionnaire were completely anonymous and that 
especially their partner would have no opportunity to be informed about their answers. 
Participants were provided with an envelope for the questionnaire, in which they could return 
it once they were done. Participants that had finished were invited to wait in the reception 
room for final payment. Once everybody had finished, participants were paid one by one in a 
separate room. Average earnings per participant were about 38.66 euro (approx. 60 USD
7
) 
and average earnings per couple 77.32 euro (approx. 120 USD). 
 
                                                             
7
 Exchange rates June 2008. 
TABLE III: REPRESENTATIVENESS OF PARTICIPANT POOL FOR THE URBAN AREA OF TOULOUSE 
Age range population census participants 
20-29 31,62 % 43,56 % 
30-39 26,40 % 32,67 % 
40-49 23,58 % 11,39 % 
50-59 18,40 % 12,38 % 
Occupation   
Employed 65,87 % 80,20 % 
Unemployed 11,21 % 7,43 % 
Inactive 22,93 % 14,36 % 
Socio-professional characteristics   
1 – Farmers 0,16 % 0,00 % 
2 – Tradesmen, Shopkeepers and Business Owners 4,16 % 3,89 % 
3 – Mangers and Secondary / University Teachers 14,48 % 23,89 % 
4 – Intermediate Professions (elementary school teachers; 
healthcare professionals; technicians) 
21,21 % 36,67 % 
5 – White collar workers (police; office workers; shop 
assistants) 
22,24 % 28,33 % 
6 – Blue collar workers  13,28 % 5,56 % 
7 – Retired 1,43 % 0,56 % 
8 – Other inactive 23,02 % 1,11 % 
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4. RESULTS 
In the following section we present general descriptive statistics of our data.  In section 4.2. 
we extend this discussion and use individual and couples characteristics to explain behavior in 
the social dilemma. 
4.1. GENERAL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 
We collected a large number of individual and household variables to access the demographic 
characteristics of our sample. Participants were recruited through newspaper announcements 
in the city of Toulouse and our first concern is whether our participants sample can be seen as 
representative for the population of the urban area of Toulouse. Table 3 compares our subject 
pool concerning age distribution, occupation and socio-professional characteristics with data 
from the last population census of the urban area of Toulouse (population census INSEE, 
1999). We conclude that our subject pool can be regarded as a rather representative sample of 
the population in this area. We have a slight bias to younger people and participants that are 
employed. Also farmers and blue collar workers are somewhat underrepresented in our 
subject pool. However these deviations seem unavoidable given the voluntary basis of the 
study and the selection bias of people that find participation in such a study valuable and 
interesting. 
We summarize mean ratings for a number of individual and household variables in Table 4. 
Overall 44% of our participating couples were married and 40% had at least one child. 
Participating couples had an average of 0.65 children.  
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Not surprisingly we observe that men report slightly more weekly hours of work (if 
employed) and that women report more hours of household work. Net income of men is 
higher than income of women. We further observe that men are on average more likely to 
know the income of their partner (62%) compared to women (50%). Women are more likely 
to overestimate their partners' income (12%) while men are more likely to underestimate their 
partners' income (25%). Finally men hold more assets individually but also have higher debts 
than women.    
 
 
TABLE IV: OVERVIEW OF DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES OF PARTICIPANTS (100 COUPLES) 
Household variables: 
Overall 
mean  
(std dev)      
Married (dummy) 0.44 (0.50)      
Years as couple 7.86 (8.83)      
Children (dummy) 0.40 (0.49)      
Children younger than 3 (dummy) 0.14 (0.35)      
Number of children by couple 0.65 (0.93)      
Household assets (in 1000 euros) 181.48 (317.24)      
Joint account (dummy) 0.57 (0.50)      
Individual variables: 
Overall 
mean  
(std dev) Men (std dev) Women (std dev) 
Corr. in 
couple 
Age 34.39 (9.94) 35.30 (9.99) 33.48 (9.85) 0.899 
Years of study above age of 16 5.78 (4.04) 5.96 (4.18) 5.59 (3.90) 0.179 
Employed (dummy) 0.80 (0.40) 0.80 (0.40) 0.80 (0.40) 0.127 
Unemployed (dummy) 0.07 (0.26) 0.09 (0.29) 0.06 (0.24) 0.068 
Inactive (dummy) 0.14 (0.35) 0.13 (0.34) 0.16 (0.37) 0.076 
If employed: hours worked per week 36.26 (8.18) 38.54 (6.51) 33.97 (9.03) 0.057 
Weekly hours of household work 7.00 (6.40) 6.27 (5.10) 7.72 (7.44) 0.201 
Individual monthly net income 1499.65 (857.23) 1663.39 (954.71) 1335.92 (715.13) 0.212 
Knows perfectly income of partner 
(dummy) 
0.56 (0.50) 0.62 (0.49) 0.50 (0.50) 0.074 
Overestimation of partners income 
(dummy) 
0.07 (0.26) 0.03 (0.17) 0.12 (0.33) 0.296 
Underestimation of partners income 
(dummy) 
0.23 (0.42) 0.25 (0.43) 0.21 (0.41) -0.124 
Correct estimation of partners income 
(dummy) 
0.70 (0.46) 0.72 (0.45) 0.67 (0.47) 0.040 
Individual assets (in 1000 euros) 47.97 (112.64) 51.71 (114.48) 44.23 (111.21) -0.011 
Individual debts (in 1000 euros) 8.66 (32.82) 14.12 (44.55) 3.19 (10.92) -0.055 
Lived in couple before (dummy) 0.28 (0.45) 0.28 (0.45) 0.29 (0.46) 0.291 
Individual bank account (dummy) 0.79 (0.41) 0.80 (0.40) 0.78 (0.42) 0.640 
 
  
   
  16 
 
PRISONERS DILEMMA AND BARGAINING 
Cooperation in the prisoners' dilemma that participants had to play with a randomly selected 
partner is 42.50 %. This rate of cooperation with strangers is very close to what was observed 
by Cooper et al. (1996) at the beginning of their series of one-shot games
8
. 
Mean cooperation in the (symmetric) prisoners' dilemmas that spouses played with each other 
was 73%.This difference is highly significant (sign test for matched pairs, p<0.001)
9
. 
However this also implies that 27% of spouses choose the opportunistic move (Figure 2).
10
  
This proportion is significantly larger than zero, with a 95% confidence interval from 21.3% 
to 33.7%. We further observe that 35% of spouses miscoordinate (i.e. one partner chooses 
cooperation while the other chooses defection). Mutual cooperation is observed for 55% of 
couples and 10% of couples mutually defect (see Figure 3). Cooperation and coordination are 
lower when interacting with a stranger (Figure 3:B).
 11
 
                                                             
8
 Cooperation rates are similar, despite the fact that our payoffs are different from theirs. 
9
 All tests are, if not otherwise noted, two-sided. 
10
 Since the prisoners' dilemma played with their partner was the first part of the experiment and we did not 
allow for practice rounds, we might expect some confusion in participants. To test for this possible effect, we 
presented half of the participants with a fourth prisoners' dilemma, which was exactly identical to the first game. 
Indeed we observe that when subjects have had the opportunity to familiarize with the game cooperation is 
higher (86%). This difference is significant (Wilcoxon, p= 0.0593). However also here the level of opportunism 
is larger than zero, with the 5% confidence interval for the proportion from 6.2% to 21.3%. 
11
 We can also use our data to investigate possible gender differences in cooperation. Cooperation levels in the 
parts where spouses interact with each other show slightly higher rates for men but these differences are not 
significant (Mann-Whitney, p > 0.299). However it seems that when participants interact with strangers, women 
are more likely to cooperate than men (men: 36%; women: 49%). This differences is only weakly significant 
(Mann-Whitney, p = 0.064). When interpreting this result it should be remembered that various contradicting 
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FIGURE 2: PROPORTION CHOOSING OPPORTUNISTIC MOVE IN PRISONERS' DILEMMA GAME 
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Cooperation levels in the asymmetric game can be used as a stress test of couples’ true 
motivation to cooperate. Asymmetric games were either in the favour of the husband or the 
wife. We first observe that behaviour across these treatments is not significantly different 
(Mann-Whitney, p = 0.884). We therefore pool observations from the two treatments and 
observe that on average defection in the asymmetric game is actually lower than in the 
symmetric game (21%). This decrease is most likely due to familiarization with the task. The 
difference is not significant at the 5% level (Wilcoxon, p = 0.069). We conclude that 
asymmetry does not increase opportunism. 
We can compare these observations with our results from the free-form bargaining game. 
Even though exchange rates were private information, an analysis of bargaining messages 
reveals that 82% of participants reveal their personal exchange rate in the first round of 
communication. Thus we can assume that most couples had full information about their 
partners' exchange rate. When considering couples where the two partners received different 
exchange rates (61 couples), 52 (85%) give more token to the partner with the higher 
exchange rate. Of the remaining couples six (9.8%) equalize earnings and three (4.92 %) 
equalize the number of tokens for each partner. Equalizing tokens can be considered as 
defection, which has a 95% confidence interval from 2.15% to 7.69%. Results do not depend 
on whether the man or the woman got the higher exchange rate. Thus as soon as we have 
communication between spouses behaviour is honest and spouses show a strong preference 
for either an efficient or equal outcome. This makes the results from the prisoner’s dilemma 
game even more interesting. Defection in the prisoner’s dilemma is therefore not due to these 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
observations of gender differences concerning cooperation have been observed. This might be due to subtle 
situational differences and to the fact that the behavior of women is more 'context dependent' than that of men 
(Croson and Gneezy, 2008). 
(a) 
N = 100 
woman  (b) 
N = 100 
woman 
spouses: D C  stranger: D C 
m
a
n
 D 10 % 16 % 
 
m
a
n
 D 31 % 33 % 
C 19 % 55 % 
 
C 20 % 16 % 
FIGURE 3: OUTCOMES FROM PRISONERS DILEMMA. (A) FROM COUPLES PLAYING WITH THEIR SPOUSE. (B) FROM GAME 
PLAYED WITH AN UNKNOWN STRANGER. 
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couples being generally competitive, but to the fact that the decision in the social dilemma 
was anonymous and taken without knowledge of the partners’ choice. 
DISTRIBUTION CHOICE 
Concern for efficiency in the couple was measured by a dictator allocation task. We 
summarize overall behavior in Figure 4. We observe that the majority of spouses are income 
poolers. When alpha is low and independent of the extent of inequality, at least 63% percent 
of participants choose the efficient allocation. When alpha is high, at least 72% choose the 
efficient allocation.
12
 However preferences for efficiency also depend on the extent of 
inequality. The willingness to pool income therefore increases with the size of the cake which 
is to share and the equality of the distribution. As a coefficient of concerns for efficiency we 
count the number of efficient choices (a number between 0 and 6) for alpha = 1.125 and for 
alpha = 1.5.
13
 For details on the calculation of this coefficient see Appendix A. 
DYADIC ADJUSTMENT SCALE 
Satisfaction with marital life was evaluated with the dyadic adjustment scale (Spanier, 1976). 
We report mean scores for the three subscales for men and women in Table 5. Satisfaction 
describes the overall satisfaction from living with the partner. Consensus measures to which 
                                                             
12
 Also on the individual level we observe that efficiency(alpha = 1.125) < efficiency(alpha = 1.5). This 
difference is highly significant (Wilcoxon, p < 0.0000). 
13
 Note that men are slightly more prone to pool income (and thus to choose the unequal distribution) than 
women. But the difference is only marginally significant for alpha = 1.125 (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.107), and not 
significant when alpha = 1.5 (p = 0.297). Across partners we observe a significant correlation of the concern for 
efficiency (Spearman: alpha=1.125: rho = 0.228, p = 0.0216; alpha=1.5: rho = 0.1867, p = 0.0615).   
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FIGURE 4: PROPORTION OF 'EFFICIENT' CHOICES BY EFFICIENCY PARAMETER (ALPHA) AND GENDER. SEE TABLE I. 
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degree spouses have similar opinions, norms and beliefs. Cohesion is representing the amount 
of time the couple spends with each other on joint tasks. Note that the rather low correlation 
of these values in couples indicates that these are personal evaluations of the situation in the 
couple and that these do not necessarily coincide. We observe no strong gender differences 
concerning marital satisfaction and our sample scores only slightly higher than observations 
from the francophone sample studied in Baillargeon et al. (1986).  
4.2. EXPLAINING OPPORTUNISM 
In the previous section we showed that a large proportion of spouses cooperated in the 
prisoner's dilemma. The cooperation rate is significantly larger than rates generally observed 
between strangers. Nevertheless a significant proportion of couples decided for the 
opportunistic move. This opportunism among spouses might seem surprising given the strong 
social ties in couples. In this section we will now attempt to explain which factors predict the 
decision to defect in this game. We present results from a Probit regression of opportunistic 
behavior in the prisoner's dilemma in Table 6.
 14
  We will first compare the explanatory power 
of a model containing individual characteristics for spouses versus stranger decisions. We will 
then extend the model to also include couple characteristics.
 
 
The first two columns of Table 6 present regressions for the opportunistic decision in the 
                                                             
14
 To test the robustness of our results, we also carried out regressions on the restricted dataset which excludes 
the 23 participants that made a 'wrong' choice in the risk aversion scale (by choosing lottery A for choice number 
10) or in the distribution task (by choosing option A for choice number 4). We also ran regressions on the 
participants' decisions in the fourth prisoners' dilemma instead of the first one (whenever available since only 
half of the subjects had the opportunity to participate in this game). The fourth game allowed the participants to 
familiarize with the game, and was exactly identical to the first.  These further analyses confirm the robustness 
of our results. 
TABLE V: OVERALL SCORES OF DYADIC ADJUSTMENT BY GENDER 
Variable 
Francophone mean 
from Baillargeon et al.  
Overall mean 
(standard deviation) 
Men Women 
Correlation in 
couple 
Consensus 
3.8  
(0.49) 
4.0741    
 (0.4280)    
4.0502    
(0.4500)    
4.0981    
(0.4056)    
0.3392 
Satisfaction 
3.9  
(0.58) 
3.9954      
(0.4900)    
3.9743    
(0.4891)         
4.0164    
(0.4924)    
0.5917 
Cohesion 
3.3  
(0.84) 
3.3610     
(0.6602)           
3.3310    
(0.5850)         
3.3910    
(0.7295)           
0.2194 
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prisoners dilemma played with a stranger and among spouses on individual variables. We 
observe strikingly different results for the game played among strangers compared to the 
game played among spouses. When playing with a stranger we observe that women and older 
participants are generally more cooperative. This result is in line with earlier studies, e.g. List 
(2004).  In couples we observe however no gender effect and an inverse age effect. Namely 
older participants act more selfishly when playing with their spouse. Individual wealth and net 
income appear only weakly significant in the model.  
In our next step we extend this basic model to also include a number of characteristics of the 
couple. We will consider variables concerning marriage, family planning, owning a joint 
account, previous couple’s experience and education difference between spouses (Table VI, 
column 3). This new model shows a number of interesting effects. We observe a negative 
effect of owning a joint account and a positive effect of being married and parent of a child on 
defection. The first effect reflects the positive correlation between cooperation and income 
pooling among spouses. The second is related to studies on marital happiness that have 
reported a negative correlation between parenthood and marital satisfaction. This correlation 
is especially strong for mothers and has been related to more household work and marital 
conflict (Glenn and McLanahan, 1982; Nomaguchi and Milkie, 2003). Further we also 
observe that a larger difference in education levels among spouses leads to more opportunistic 
behavior from the better educated partner. The last observation can be linked to results 
suggesting that the difference in education in a couple can be seen as a cause of unbalanced 
bargaining power in the couple (Andreoni et al, 2003, Browning and Bonke, 2009).  
 
  
   
  21 
 
We finally extend our model to also include a number of variables concerning the individuals 
attitude in the experiment (Table VI, column 4 and 5). The variables we consider include the 
concern for efficiency in the couple as measured by our allocation task and the marital 
TABLE VI: PROBIT REGRESSION OF OPPORTUNISTIC MOVE IN PRISONERS DILEMMA ON INDIVIDUAL AND COUPLE 
CHARACTERISTICS. 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5')   (5'')   
 strangers  spouses  spouses  spouses   
spouses 
women   
spouses 
men  
         bivariate analysis  
Male  0.339 * -0.094   -0.075   -0.040         
 (0.184)  (0.197)  (0.207)  (0.218)   
Age -0.019 ** 0.025 ** -0.000  -0.003 -0.053 ** 0.045 ** 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.015) (0.023)  (0.023)  
Years of study above age of 16 0.009 0.007  -0.044  -0.021 -0.072  0.028  
 (0.023) (0.024)  (0.034)  (0.037) (0.056)  (0.054)  
Individual monthly net income  0.087 -0.215 * -0. 181  -0. 206 -0. 160  -0. 340  
(in 1000 euro) (0.122) (0.129)  (0. 138)  (0.146) (0.260)  (0. 230)  
Individual assets (in 100000 euro) 0.069 0. 156 * 0. 145  0.126 -0.046  0. 286 * 
 (0.085) (0. 082)  (0. 089)  (0.092) (0. 140)  (0. 170)  
Married    0.467 * 0.444 0.852 ** -0.123  
    (0.265)  (0.277)  (0.421)  (0.418)  
Children  (dummy)    0.699 ** 0.631 ** 1.049 ** 0.310  
    (0.289)  (0.300)  (0.450)  (0.465)  
Partner lived in couple before    -0.274  -0.265  0.346  -0.978 ** 
    (0.244)  (0.256)  (0.375)  (0.444)  
Difference in education level (a)    0.062 ** 0.057 ** 0.094 ** 0.059  
    (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.044)  (0.042)  
Joint account    -0.460 * -0.319  0.070  -0.427  
    (0.246)  (0.254)  (0.380)  (0.384)  
Number of efficient choices        -0.177 
*** -0.273 *** -0.172  
(allocation task)       (0.064) 
 (0.420)  (0.117)  
Consensus       -0.778 
*** -0.400  -1.004 ** 
       (0.262) 
 (0.420)  (0.418)  
Constant 0.473  -1.210 
*** -0.438 3.517 *** 3.587 * 3.138  
 (0.344)  (0.360)  (0.427) (1.202) (1.911) (1.949) 
Observations 200   200   200   200   100   100  
Pseudo R2 0.030  0.045  0.124 0.188 0.270 0.275  
Log likelihood -132.233  -112.330  -103.105  -95.506  -86.250 
LR test - Chi2     18.45 
*** 
15.20 
*** 
    
Standard errors in parentheses               
 
    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
    
(a) individual level of education minus spouse's level of education 
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satisfaction reported by each individual.
15
 We present the model for all observations (column 
4) and separate regressions for men and women (column 5' and 5''). These separate 
regressions are a bivariate probit and present a better fit.  They allow controlling for 
correlation between error terms of the male and female equations for each household.
16 
Indeed, individual characteristics explaining defection, some of them unobserved, are likely to 
be correlated in couples. As predicted, the concern for efficiency and greater marital 
satisfaction lead to cooperative behavior. While the two variables have a similar impact for 
men and women we observe also a number of interesting differences. The model for women 
is characterized by a very strong effect of being married or having children and a relatively 
high education level. Men are more cooperative when their partner has previously had 
experience with another partner. This might indicate a credible threat from the partners’ side 
to end the relationship but might also be related to other factors. Men however react more 
opportunistically when wealthier. This might be related to increased bargaining power and is 
in line with experimental evidence showing more selfish behavior from the rich participants in 
repeated interactions between players with different wealth levels (Armantier, 2006). Finally 
the previously observed age effect is only present for men, while older women tend to be 
more cooperative. The inclusion of age difference into the regression was not significant. 
Hence, the age effect might be rather related to different individual outside options dependent 
on gender and age on the marriage market. 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper we presented results from a large experiment on 100 maritally living couples 
from the urban area of Toulouse. Spouses participated in a symmetric and an asymmetric 
prisoner's dilemma with their partner and in a prisoner's dilemma with an unknown partner of 
the same sex as their spouse. This data set enables us to observe behavior in a social dilemma 
in couples and contrast behavior to interactions with a stranger. We can observe overall 
                                                             
15
 To control for the effects risk aversion might have in decisions involving strategic uncertainty we also 
measured risk aversion (Hold and Laury, 2002). Almost 70 % of our subjects are risk-averse, 16.32 % can be 
classified as risk neutral and 14.21 % as risk seeking. Our results are in line with those of the literature (e.g. Holt 
and Laury, 2002; Harrison et al., 2007). Men seem to be slightly more risk seeking than women, however this 
differences is not significant (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.28). Risk aversion is not significant when included in the 
models presented in Table VI. 
16
 The use of simple probits does not provide accurate statistical tests due to a biased variance-covariance matrix. 
To address this difficulty, we carry out a 'seemingly unrelated probit regression'. The estimated covariance 
between the residuals of both equations is not significant (rho = -0.0567, with a standard error of 0.321). 
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cooperation rates for couples and study whether couples as such are generally more or less 
willing to cooperate than the average population.  
Our results indicate that cooperation rates in the couple are clearly higher than cooperation 
with an unknown other. The general cooperation rate by maritally living people with strangers 
is however similar to behavior usually observed for these kind of games. What is noteworthy 
is however that even though we observe a high concern for efficiency and equity among 
couples in a non-anonymous bargaining task, cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma is not at 
its maximum.  
In the second part of this paper we used demographic and psychological variables to predict 
why some participants decide for opportunistic behavior with their spouse. We identified a 
model that can predict behavior in the games played among spouses; however the same model 
cannot predict behavior in the game played with an unknown other. We further observe that 
the model for men and women is quite different. Specifically men act: more opportunistically 
when older and richer. Men become more cooperative when their partner has lived with 
someone else before and when reporting higher consensus in the couple. By contrast women 
act: more opportunistic when young, being married, having a child and having a relatively 
higher education level. Women act more cooperative with higher concerns for efficiency. 
These results lead us to two interesting conclusions, one methodological and one concerning 
household decisions making. The fact that we can identify a model that performs well in 
predicting behavior for decisions made in couples hints at a possible problem with the design 
of many economic experiments. Traditionally economic experiments are conducted under 
complete anonymity without any information about the partner. This reduction of information 
might seem to avoid framing the situation; however it cannot control how participants 
'imagine' their partner. Thus the attempt of controlling the environment, might indeed lead to 
a loss of control of how the situation is perceived. Given that experiments have shown that 
dependent on the gender of the interaction partner very different behaviors might be elicited 
(Datta Gupta et al., 2005), a lack of such information might make it impossible to predict 
behavior. Indeed couples are very well informed about their partner, his or her preferences, 
income and expectations. Thus given all of this information their decision in a social dilemma 
can be predicted based on their own characteristics. 
  
   
  24 
 
Finally cooperation in the couple is not at its maximum. This casts doubt on the systematic 
recourse to the Pareto-efficiency assumption in household decision-making models (see 
among others Chiappori, 1988; Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1992; Flinn, 2000). In analyzing 
the impact of characteristics on defection, one should note the strong negative impact of 
having children on women’s cooperation rates. Given that these results fit very well into the 
literature on life satisfaction in families, it seems an important issue that should also be 
considered in economic models of household decision making. Gender differences in 
household decision making have been previously observed. Iversen et al. (2006) noted that 
efficiency is higher when women control the common account. More generally women are 
often observed to invest more into children and public goods to the family. However this 
cooperation might be mostly directed at the children and not at the partner. Thus presence of 
children can in turn lead to greater egoism in social dilemmas played solely with the partner.  
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APPENDIX A: METHOD USED TO ANALYZE CHOICES IN THE DISTRIBUTION TASK 
To summarize behavior in the distribution task we investigated if behavior can be represented 
by a simple indicator. We assume that participants prefer B to A for choice number 4, and that 
for increasing inequality in their own or their partners favor they will eventually switch to A. 
We will use the following definition: 
Definition: A subject “switches in an expected way” if: 
 In choices 1 to 3, there is no switch from B to A (or from B to I, or from I to A). So 
the only sequences we should observe is A  B, A  I, I  B. 
 In choices 5 to 7, there is no switch from A to B (or from I to B, or from A to I) the 
only sequences we should observe is B  A, I  A, B  I. 
Definition: An “expected decision pattern” is a sequence of decisions such that: 
 In choice 4, the subject chooses B. 
 The subject switches in an expected way. 
Indeed we observe that a large majority of participants (173 subjects or 86% of them) show an 
expected decision pattern. If we include the subjects who switched in an expected way but 
answered wrongly in only one of the two choices number 4, and subjects who answered 
correctly in both choices 4 but switched once in an unexpected way, we are able to take into 
account 92% of the subjects. Given this high percentage of participants behaving according to 
this expected decision pattern, we will use the number of B choices as our indicator. Note that 
given participants show an expected decision pattern and there is no more than one “I” in each 
sequence, we will lose no information from using this indicator. 
To summarize behavior in the distribution task we use the following indicator. First we count 
for decisions 1 to 3 and 5 to 7 the number of income pooling choices (B). This number will lie 
between 0 and 3. We call the number of B choices when inequality is to ones' own 
disadvantage: efficiency_own; and name the number of B choices when inequality is to the 
partners' disadvantage: efficiency_other. Given these indicators we can test whether 
efficiency concerns are significantly different when inequality is to one's own or to one's 
partners disadvantage (i.e. efficiency_own = efficiency_other). And we can observe the 
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increase in concerns for efficiency when alpha is increased. 
For the 173 participants that can be classified according to our definition, we observe that for 
alpha = 1.125: the average for efficiency_own is 2.25; and the average for efficiency_other is 
2.35. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the two coefficients are the same (Wilcoxon, p = 
0.27). When alpha = 1.5 we observe: efficiency_own = 2.65; efficiency_other = 2.64. Again 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the two coefficients are the same (Wilcoxon, p = 0.48). 
We therefore conclude that we can pool the two coefficients into an overall measure of 
efficiency for each level of alpha. 
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APPENDIX B: DYADIC ADJUSTMENT SCALE (Spanier, 1976)  
Subscales are indicated after each item: Cons = consensus subscale; Aff = affectional 
expression; Coh = cohesion subscale; Sat = satisfaction 
Most persons have disagreements in their relationships. Please indicate below the approximate extent of agreement or 
disagreement between you and your partner for each item on the following list. 
 Always 
Agree 
Almost 
Always 
Agree 
Occasionally 
Disagree 
Frequently  
Disagree 
Almost 
Always 
Disagree 
Always 
Disagree 
1. Handling family finances (Cons) 5 4 3 2 1 0 
2. Matters of recreation (Cons) 5 4 3 2 1 0 
3. Religious matters (Cons) 5 4 3 2 1 0 
4. Demonstrations of affection 
(Aff) 
5 4 3 2 1 0 
5. Friends (Cons)  5 4 3 2 1 0 
6. Sex relations (Aff) 5 4 3 2 1 0 
7. Conventionality (correct or 
proper behavior) (Cons) 
5 4 3 2 1 0 
8. Philosophy of life (Cons) 5 4 3 2 1 0 
9. Ways of dealing with parents or 
in-laws (Cons) 
5 4 3 2 1 0 
10. Aims, goals, and things 
believed important (Cons) 
5 4 3 2 1 0 
11. Amount of time spent together 
(Cons)  
5 4 3 2 1 0 
12. Making major decisions (Cons) 5 4 3 2 1 0 
13. Household tasks (Cons) 5 4 3 2 1 0 
14. Leisure time interests and 
activities (Cons) 
5 4 3 2 1 0 
15. Career decisions (Cons) 5 4 3 2 1 0 
 
 All the time Most of the 
time 
More often 
than not 
Occasionally Rarely Never 
16. How often do you discuss or 
have you considered divorce, 
separation, or terminating your 
relationship?  (Sat) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
17. How often do you or your mate 
leave the house after a fight? (Sat) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
18. In general, how often do you 
think that things between you and 
your partner are going well? (Sat) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
19. Do you confide in your mate? 
(Sat) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
20. Do you ever regret that you 
married? (or lived together) (Sat) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
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21. How often do you and your 
partner quarrel? (Sat) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
22. How often do you and your 
mate "get on each other's nerves?" 
(Sat) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 Every Day Almost Every 
Day 
Occasionally Rarely Never 
23 Do you kiss your mate? (Sat) 4 3 2 1 0 
      
 All of them Most of them Some of them Very few of 
them 
None of them 
 
24. Do you and your mate engage 
in outside interests together? (Coh) 
4 3 2 1 0 
How often would you say the following events occur between you and your mate? 
 Never Less than 
once a 
month 
Once or 
twice a 
month 
Once or 
twice a 
week 
Once a day More often 
25. Have a stimulating 
exchange of ideas (Coh)  
0 1 2 3 4 5 
26. Laugh together (Coh) 0 1 2 3 4 5 
27. Calmly discuss something 
(Coh) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
28. Work together on a project 
(Coh) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
'These are some things about which couples sometimes agree and sometime disagree. Indicate if either item below caused 
differences of opinions or were problems in your relationship during the past few weeks. (Check yes or no)  
 Yes No 
29. Being too tired for sex. (Aff) 0 1 
30. Not showing love. (Aff)  0 1 
31. The dots on the following line represent different degrees of happiness in your relationship. The middle point, "happy." 
represents the degree of happiness of most relationships. Please circle the dot which best describes the degree of happiness, 
all things considered, of your relationship. (Sat) 
Extremely 
Unhappy 
Fairly 
Unhappy 
A Little 
Unhappy 
Happy Very Happy Extremely 
Happy 
Perfect 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
32. Which of the following statements best describes how you feel about the future of your relationship? (Sat) 
 5. I want desperately for my relationship to succeed, and I would go to almost any length to see that it does. 
 4. I want very much for m) relationship to succeed, and I will do all I can to see that it does. 
 3. I want very much for my relationship to succeed. and I will do my fair share to see that it does. 
 2. It would be nice if my relationship succeeded, but I can't do much more than I'm doing now to help it to succeed. 
 1. It would be nice if it succeeded, but I refuse to do any more than what I am doing now to keep the relationship 
 going. 
 0. My relationship can never succeed, and there is no  more that I can do to keep the relationship going. 
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APPENDIX C: EXPERIMENTAL HANDOUTS, FEMALE VERSION. 
 
1. Experimental handouts PD game: 
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2. Experimental handouts risk aversion task: 
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3. Experimental handout distribution task: 
 
 
